The coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) has caused shortages of life-sustaining medical resources, and future waves of the virus may cause further scarcity. The Yale New Haven Health System developed a triage protocol to allocate scarce medical resources during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the primary goal of saving the most lives possible, and a secondary goal of making triage assessments and decisions consistent, transparent, and fair. We outline the process of developing the protocol, summarize the protocol, and discuss the major ethical challenges (...) encountered, along with our answers to the challenges. These challenges include (1) the role of age and chronic comorbidities; (2) evaluating children and pregnant patients; (3) racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in health; (4) prioritization of healthcare workers; and (5) balancing clinical judgment versus protocolized assessments.We conclude with a review of the limitations of our protocol and the lessons learned. We hope that a robust public discussion of such protocols and the ethical challenges they raise will result in the fairest possible processes, less need for triage, and more lives saved during future waves of the pandemic and similar public health emergencies. (shrink)

We agree with Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland’s (2023) assessment that the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) should be viewed as an essential requirement of the organ donation process, and that the essence of the r...

This article offers some general criticisms of the idea that any political theory can legitimate public health interventions, and then some particular criticisms of Civic Republicanism as a political theory for public health. Civic Republicanism, I argue, legitimizes liberty-infringing public health interventions by demanding high levels of civic engagement in framing and reviewing them; to demand such engagement in pursuit of such a baseline value as health will leave insufficient civic energy for the pursuit of higher values.

This article traces the multiple enactments of sex in clinical practices of transgender medicine to argue against the presumed singularity of ‘transexuality’. Using autoethnography to analyse my own experience as a trans patient, I describe my clinical encounters with doctors, psychiatrists and surgeons in order to theorise sex as multiple. Following recent developments in science and technology studies (STS) that advance the work of Judith Butler on sex as performatively reproduced, I use a praxiographic approach to argue that treatment practices (...) produce particular iterations of what sex (and transexuality) ‘is’ and how these processes limit and foreclose other trans possibilities. I consider the ethical, political and material-discursive implications of treatment practices and offer a series of reflections about the effects and effectiveness of current clinical practices and the possibilities for intervening in such processes in order that, following Annemarie Mol, we might (re)make sex (and transexuality) differently. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

This study represents an improvement in the ethics scales inventory published in a 1988 Journal of Business Ethics article. The article presents the distillation and validation process whereby the original 33 item inventory was reduced to eight items. These eight items comprise the following ethical dimensions: a moral equity dimension, a relativism dimension, and a contractualism dimension. The multidimensional ethics scale demonstrates significant predictive ability.

We welcome and applaud Wilkinson’s impressive and subtle exploration of the possible considerations of frailty as a criterion for triage in times of pandemic-dr...

Every country's law permits medical experimentation on animals. While some countries protect particular kinds of animals from being subject to experimentation—notably great apes and endangered species—very few place concrete limitations on what researchers may cause animals to suffer, given sufficient scientific justification. What laws do, instead, is establish standards for the humane treatment and housing of animals in labs, and they encourage researchers to limit or seek alternatives to the use of animals, when doing that is consistent with the scientific (...) goals of their research.The system that has evolved in the United States combines elements of sometimes competing regulatory philosophies. The result is a complex, multilayered system that addresses the most important concerns, but, partly because of historical accident, also leaves some gaps. Even proponents of medical research on animals can see obvious ways in which the regulatory structure could be changed to benefit animals. Perhaps more important, though, is the fact that the existing regulatory structure, imperfect though it may be, is elastic enough to accommodate substantial changes that could reduce unnecessary animal suffering. (shrink)

The question of whether the normative testimony of ethics experts should be admissible under the rules of evidence has been the subject of much debate. Professor Imwinkelried's paper is an effort to get us, for a moment, to change that subject. He seeks to turn our attention, instead, to a means by which bioethics experts’ normative analyses might come before the court without regard to the rules of evidence - a means lying formally outside those rules’ jurisdiction. The court, he (...) argues, may freely consider evidence from expert bioethicists so long as it is performing a legislative rather than an adjudicative function. The rules of evidence apply to the court's efforts to find the facts of a particular case, Imwinkelried argues, but they do not constrain the court's investigations relative to its creative law-making efforts. (shrink)

In this book, R.E. Allen provides a translation of the 'Parmenides' along with a structural analysis that procedes on the assumption that formal elements, logical and dramatic, are important to its interpretation and that the argument of the Parmenides is aporetic, a statement of metaphysical perplexities.

In the article “Principled Conscientious Provision: Referral Symmetry and Its Implications for Protecting Secular Conscience,” Abram L. Brummett, Tanner Hafen, and Mark C. Navin reject what they call the “referral asymmetry” in U.S. conscientious objection law in medicine, which recognizes rights of conscientiously objecting physicians to withhold referrals for medical interventions but does not (yet) recognize rights of physicians to make referrals for medical interventions to which they are morally committed but to which their health care institutions are morally opposed. (...) This commentary concentrates on a second asymmetry, namely, the relationship of a health care provider's referral or nonreferral to the medical standard of care. The commentary argues that this second asymmetry seems to require action more appropriately recognized as civil disobedience than conscientious provision of referral. (shrink)

Should we let personal responsibility for health-related behavior influence the allocation of healthcare resources? In this paper, we clarify what it means to be responsible for an action. We rely on a crucial conceptual distinction between being responsible and holding someone responsible, and show that even though we might be considered responsible and blameworthy for our health-related actions, there could still be well-justified reasons for not considering it reasonable to hold us responsible by giving us lower priority. We transform these (...) philosophical considerations into analytical use first by assessing the general features of health-related actions and the corresponding healthcare needs. Then, we identify clusters of structural features that even adversely affected people cannot reasonably deny constitute actions for which they should be held responsible. We summarize the results in an analytical framework that can be used by decision-makers when considering personal responsibility for health as a criterion for setting priorities. (shrink)

Translational ethics (TE) has been developed into a specific approach, which revolves around the argument that strategies for bridging the theory‐practice gap in bioethics must themselves be justified on ethical terms. This version of TE incorporates normative, empirical and foundational ethics research and continues to develop through application and in the face of new ethical challenges. Here, I explore the idea that the academic field of bioethics has not yet sufficiently analysed its own philosophical foundation for how it can, and (...) should, be practically relevant; neither has it comprehensively discussed the limitations on what impacts bioethicists should pursue. As a result, there has not been adequate training on how to suitably and appropriately impact real‐world practices. Moreover, bioethical perspectives are often competing with other strong interests, for example, economic and political, which may weaken their impact on policy‐making. The TE approach I propose can not only facilitate practical impacts of academic bioethics by being better informed by real‐world ethical issues but it also supports targeted and ethical justifications of the actual impact of academic work in real‐world contexts. In this paper, I clarify the premises for this TE approach, identify further challenges and sketch out potential solutions for the implementation of this methodological framework. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility is a recognised and common part of business activity. Some of the regularly cited motives behind CSR are employee morale, recruitment and retention, with employees acknowledged as a key organisational stakeholder. Despite the significance of employees in relation to CSR, relatively few studies have examined their engagement with CSR and the impediments relevant to this engagement. This exploratory case study-based research addresses this paucity of attention, drawing on one to one interviews and observation in a large UK (...) energy company. A diversity of engagement was found, ranging from employees who exhibited detachment from the CSR activities within the company, to those who were fully engaged with the CSR activities, and to others who were content with their own personal, but not organisational, engagement with CSR. A number of organisational context impediments, including poor communication, a perceived weak and low visibility of CSR culture, and lack of strategic alignment of CSR to business and personal objectives, served to explain this diversity of employee engagement. Social exchange theory is applied to help explore the volition that individual employees have towards their engagement with CSR activities, and to consider the implications of an implicit social, rather than explicit economic, contract between an organisation and its employees in their engagement with CSR. (shrink)

Three states—Oregon, Washington, and Vermont—have used straightforwardly democratic means to legalize the practice formerly known as “physician‐assisted suicide” but now termed “aid‐in‐dying.” In two states—Montana and New Mexico—aid‐in‐dying has been declared legal neither by directly democratic action by citizens nor by representatively democratic action by the legislature but by court rulings in cases brought by aid‐in‐dying activists. The court case in New Mexico (Morris v. New Mexico, 2014) is undoubtedly of greater significance to the rest of the states. The Morris (...) opinion is as interesting for what it declined to hold as for what it held. (shrink)

Ethicists and physicians all over the world have been working on triage protocols to plan for the possibility that the Covid‐19 pandemic will result in shortages of intensive care unit beds, ventilators, blood products, or medications. In reflecting on those protocols, many health care workers have noticed that, outside the pandemic shortage situation, we routinely supply patients in the ICU with invasive and painful care that will not help the patients survive even their hospitalization. This is the kind of pointless (...) care that even the most basic protocol would triage against. Perhaps this widespread reflection on triage standards will draw our attention to our ongoing custom of supplying burdensome and inefficacious care to those near the end of life—care that most health care providers would not want for themselves. This essay argues that reflecting on triage could help us improve end‐of‐life care. (shrink)

For the past few years I've had the distinct privilege to edit the Hastings Center Report's Policy & Politics column. The column—as indicated by a little block of text at its end—was originally conceived as, and remains, a joint production of HCR and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. For me, as column editor, this means that I can accept contributions only from ASBH members. Luckily this presents me with an extremely large pool of talent from which to draw! (...) I am very proud of the fact that a large majority of contributors to the column in the last several years had never written in HCR before I invited them to contribute. But naturally, I don't know everyone, and I can't keep track of everything. I'd love to get even more unsolicited offers of P&P contributions than I already enjoy. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is simply to show that, in bioethics no less than in other areas of health care, policy in democracies is shaped not only by principles and values, but also — and to some extent independently — by the shape and history of particular political institutions and past policies. “Path dependency,” or what one scholar has called the “accidental logics” of already-existing institutions, condition and guide national policy choices. These institutional and historical pressures can even create (...) substantial policy divergences between quite likeminded nations. I shall illustrate the point using some comparative data about national policies regarding research on human embryonic stem cells. The fact that gaps can develop between values and policies is readily visible to anyone who compares national stemcell research policies to the expressed attitudes of the citizens of various democratic countries regarding human embryonic stem-cell research. The role of path dependency and the accidental logics of institutional structure in creating those gaps can be illustrated by tracking down the details of the development of human embryonic stem cell policies in a few different countries. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Introduction: The Moral Arbitrariness of Health Status Justice as a Social Virtue Libertarian and Conservative Arguments Utilitarian Approaches to Justice in Health Care Finance Rawls' s Theory of Justice Justice and the Social Determinants of Health The Capabilities Approach International Justice and Health Conclusion References.

These are hard days for globalism. A major candidate for the United States presidency ran on an anti-immigration, anti-free-trade platform and denounced such venerable international institutions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations. The European Union is under threat after the vote for Brexit; the Euro is under strain. China is denouncing and ignoring the result of an international arbitration over its claims to the South China Sea. Nationalist, xenophobic political parties are in the ascendency around the (...) world, buoyed by the fears and pains of populations for whom global trade has been no boon and to whom waves of new immigrants seem threatening both economically and socially. So it is both strange and uplifting, in this atmosphere, to encounter the ambitious and enthusiastic globalism of Lawrence Gostin's important, field-founding work, Global Health Law. Equal parts encyclopedia and manifesto, the book seeks both to provide exhaustive and up-to-date descriptions of the already-substantial body of international health law and of its implementing institutions and to chart Gostin's vision for their vigorous expansion. And that vision is nothing if not expansive. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 23-25.

In the United States, while it is legal for physicians to prescribe drugs for “off-label” indications (uses for which the drugs do not have Food and Drug Administration approval), it is largely—though not entirely—illegal for drug manufacturers to promote off-label uses of their drugs to physicians. In recent months, the rules against off-label marketing have been rigorously enforced: in October, Allergan reached a $375 million settlement over off-label promotion of Botox; in September, Novartis settled an off-label marketing dispute for $422.5 (...) million, and Forest Laboratories settled one for $313 million. These were only the latest in a series of criminal and civil settlements on off-label promotion, the most .. (shrink)

On the fourth day of his presidency, Donald Trump reinstated and greatly expanded the “Mexico City policy,” which imposes antiabortion restrictions on U.S. foreign health aid. In general, the policy has prohibited U.S. funding of any family-planning groups that use even non-U.S. funds to perform abortions; prohibited aid recipients from lobbying for liberalization of abortion laws; prohibited nongovernment organizations from creating educational materials on abortion as a family-planning method; and prohibited health workers from referring patients for legal abortions in any (...) cases other than rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother. The policy's prohibition on giving aid to any organization that performs abortions is aimed at limiting alleged indirect funding of abortions. The argument is that if U.S. money is used to fund nonabortion programs of an abortion-providing NGO, then the NGO can simply shift the money thus saved into its abortion budget. Outside the context of abortion, we do not reason this way. And the policy's remaining three prohibitions are deeply troubling. (shrink)

Reply to a commentary by Timothy F. Murphy.

The United Kingdom's coalition government has just begun the most sweeping overhaul of the National Health Service since its inception.1 Under the reforms, 80 percent of the NHS budget will be handed over to about five hundred local consortia of primary care physicians, who will be empowered to make medical spending and allocation decisions for their patients. The 152 existing Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), which purchase hospital and community care for patients and oversee primary care physicians in their regions, will (...) close their doors, leaving local doctors with the power to decide which interventions are appropriate, and which too expensive.2 Hospitals and community service providers will have greater freedom .. (shrink)

We punish people who recklessly or deliberately expose others to HIV? Why not try to force HIV-positive individuals to disclose their.

The United Kingdom is partway through a multiyear process of revising its law on surrogacy, both traditional and gestational. In October of 2019, the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission—statutorily created independent bodies charged with keeping the law under review and recommending reforms whenever necessary—completed a public consultation on surrogacy. In June, the commissions published an extensive consultation paper laying out the case for surrogacy reform and making tentative recommendations about how revision should proceed. The (...) commissions are now digesting the public's responses, and they aim to have a final report on their proposed revisions of the law and a draft bill for consideration by Parliament in 2021. The foundation of current U.K. surrogacy law was laid in the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985. There are numerous problems with the existing regime. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 5, Page 4-5, September–October 2022.

Early in 2018, the Trump administration's Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued a guidance letter outlining a new and controversial kind of Medicaid waiver proposal. The administration invited states to propose waivers that would impose work (or other “community engagement”) requirements as a condition of eligibility for Medicaid. The Trump administration and state proponents of work requirements want to force able‐bodied Medicaid beneficiaries into the workplace. Critics allege that this is because they mistakenly believe that low‐income individuals are not (...) working because they're lazy or because aid programs provide them with a disincentive to work. Proponents respond that the requirements can lower the public programs' costs while helping its recipients. Medicaid data seems to show that the work‐requirement proposals are a solution in search of a real‐life problem. (shrink)

The U.S. Supreme Court has likely already decided how much, if any, of President Obama's signature Affordable Care Act it is going to strike down as unconstitutional; its holding will be published this summer. No matter what the Court decides, though, it will send state and federal legislators scrambling—either to implement the law or to deal with the consequences of its alteration. There are various decisions the Court might make, but it is still most apt either to leave the ACA (...) standing, or to selectively invalidate some of its mandate‐related provisions. In either case, there will be exchanges to design and manage, subsidies to allocate, transparency standards to design and enforce. The Court's decision will thus mark the beginning, not the end, of health reform. (shrink)

When loyalty is discussed, a very rare thing in recent years, it is sometimes listed as one of the virtues and just as often derided. Its relationship to the virtues, or to the other virtues, is difficult to discern, and that is at least partly because the role that judgement plays in loyalty seems odd. The argument of this paper is that there is a core value to loyalty, and that understanding this core value is of critical importance in understanding (...) the virtues despite the fact that loyalty is not itself one of them. I shall suggest at the end of the paper that it is the raw material of the virtues and of at least some vices. (shrink)

No one is excused from doing what he ought to do merely because he is unwilling to do it. But what if others are unwilling to play their necessary role in some joint venture that you all ought to undertake: might that excuse you from doing what you yourself ought to do as part of that? It would, if you were genuinely willing to play your necessary part if they were. But the unwillingness of everyone involved cannot reciprocally serve to (...) excuse one another from doing what they ought to do. (shrink)

Friesen et al. (2023) article explores tensions within institutional review boards (IRBs) when they aim both to protect participants from harm and to include under-represented populations in clinic...